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It is well known that the funding status of state and local government defined benefit pension plans,
as measured by the accounting methodology prescribed by the Governmental Accounting Standards
Board (GASB), improves when the plans take on more investment risk. This paper documents several
lesser known logical implications of the GASB methodology. In particular, I show that GASB accounting
is susceptible to the “Yogi Berra fallacy,” under which a pizza is less filling when sliced into fewer
pieces: GASB gives different “valuations” for the exact same assets and liabilities when they are partitioned
differently among plans. Moreover, the marginal valuation of assets can be negative under GASB.
In such cases a plan can improve its GASB funding status literally by burning money. Finally, I show
that GASB’s methodology is exactly equivalent to fairly valuing plan liabilities, but accounting for
stocks at more than twice their traded prices, and further crediting a plan an additional dollar for each
dollar of stock that it intends to buy in the future.
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State and local government spending makes up one eighth of the US economy. Sub-national 
government entities employ one out of seven US workers, and these workers generally 
participate in state sponsored defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Many of these workers have 
no savings, and roughly 30%, mostly public safety workers, are not enrolled in Social Security, 
meaning that these plans represent many public employees’ sole source of post-retirement 
income. 
Governments value their pension liabilities, which run to trillions of dollars, using a 
methodology prescribed by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). These 
valuations are employed in planning and budgeting. Because they routinely provide the basis for 
multi-billion dollar decisions, their accuracy has direct implications for government efficiency. 
As a result, it is GASB’s expressed goal “to develop high-quality standards of accounting and 
financial reporting for the state and local governments… [which] lead to information in financial 
reports that improves transparency, assists in assessing accountability, and is useful for making 
important decisions” (GASB 2011a).  
There remains substantial disagreement, however, regarding the validity of GASB’s prescribed 
methodology. While most actuaries and the National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators support GASB’s methodology, academic economists disagree with its underlying 
principles with near unanimity. The heart of the disagreement lies with the rate used to discount 
liabilities. GASB discounts projected benefit payments at the expected return on plan assets, 
because the Board believes this rate “best reflects the employer’s projected sacrifice of 
resources” (GASB 2011b). Financial economists prefer a lower discount rate, because 
accumulated pension promises are viewed as nearly default-free and the basic tenets of financial 
economics require that cash-flows are discounted at rates reflecting their risks.  
The difference in the aggregate liability posed by state and local DB pension plans calculated 
using the discount rates preferred by GASB and financial economists is enormous—in excess of 
two trillion dollars (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2008, 20011a, 2011b). The two methodologies also 
yield dramatically different conclusions regarding the annual cost of the new benefits accrued by 
workers each year. The cost of the new pension benefits earned by a state’s work force each year 
is roughly 12-14% of total payroll when calculated using GASB’s methodology, but averages 
more than twice that amount when calculated using the methodology preferred by financial 2 
 
economists (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011c). As a result, GASB underestimates the true cost of 
state and local government workers by almost a hundred billion dollars a year. 
The debate over the correct methodology for valuing government pension liabilities has been 
running for at least ten years (Bader 2001, Bader and Gold 2003). GASB supporters correctly 
assert that holding high average return assets reduces the expected future unfunded liability, and 
believe that this justifies recognizing lower unfunded liabilities today. Critics correctly assert that 
this allows plans to improve their GASB funding status simply by taking on more risk, despite 
the fact that this does not in any way alter the nature of their liabilities. While the economic and 
actuarial professions continue to actively debate the issues (on the pro-GASB side see, for 
example, Midlin 2008 or Brainard 2008; for GASB critiques see Brown and Wilcox 2009 or 
Biggs 2011), neither side is swayed by the other’s arguments. Economists are unlikely to 
convince the actuarial profession through appeals to covariances or state contingent pricing, 
while the actuarial profession will never convince economists to ignore the basic precepts of 
financial economics. This paper consequently takes a different approach, and simply illustrates 
some potentially problematic implications of the GASB methodology using elementary 
examples.  
First, I show that GASB is not really a valuation method. A valuation method should recognize 
that “more is more,” in the sense that adding a dollar to any given set of assets and liabilities 
increases the set’s value. It should also assign a unique value to a given set of assets and 
liabilities. The GASB methodology for accounting for net pension liabilities does not satisfy 
either of these conditions.  
Under GASB it is possible that a plan can improve its funding status by literally burning money. 
GASB recognizes that cash and bonds are valuable assets, but nevertheless penalizes a plan for 
holding these, by forcing it to recognize a larger liability. Destroying a dollar (i.e., reducing its 
cash or bond holdings by a dollar while holding all other asset holdings fixed) reduces a plan’s 
assets by exactly a dollar, but can reduce its GASB liability by more than a dollar. In these cases 
plans can reduce their GASB recognized underfundings by destroying assets.  
Many states also sponsor multiple pension plans, and GASB gives different “values” for the 
exact same assets and liabilities depending on how these are partitioned across plans. As a result, 3 
 
a state can improve its GASB funding status simply by redistributing its assets and liabilities 
across plans, without in any way altering the nature of either its liabilities or the assets that it 
holds. 
I also show that the methodology explicitly prescribed by GASB can be recast as an alternative, 
equivalent methodology, which entails discounting both a plan’s liabilities and the expected cash 
flows generated by its assets, as well as the expected cash flows of the assets it plans to buy in 
the future, at the rate used to discount high quality municipal bonds. Discounting the expected 
cash flows from a dollar of stock held in a typical DB pension plan yields a “valuation” of 
roughly two and a half dollars. The GASB methodology is therefore equivalent to valuing 
pension liabilities in the same manner used to value the states’ other long term liabilities, 
accounting for stocks at roughly two and a half times their traded prices, and further crediting 
plans making their actuarially determined contributions more than a dollar for each dollar of 
stock that they intend to buy in the future.  
The following pages describe each of these logical implications of the GASB methodology in 
greater detail, and illustrate them using simple examples.  
Improving GASB funding status by destroying money 
GASB presents managers of public pension plans with an unintended option for reducing their 
recognized liabilities. A plan can, under GASB logic, sometimes improve its funding status by 
literally burning money. This result holds because the marginal value of a dollar of assets, as 
measured by GASB, can be negative. By destroying a dollar’s worth of T-bills, or other cash-
equivalents, a manager decreases a plan’s assets, but increases the remaining assets’ expected 
returns. These higher asset returns decrease the plan’s liability, as recognized by GASB, and this 
decrease can more than offset the loss of assets.  
This can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider two pension plans, plans “A” and “B.” 
Plan A has a single member, a 35 year old worker with five years of service who plans to retire 
in thirty years with a projected salary of $105,000. The plan holds $10,000 of stocks that have an 
expected return of 10%. Plan B also has a single member, identical in all ways to that in plan A, 
holds the exact same stocks, and additionally owns $10,000 dollars worth of T-bills providing a 
risk-free yield of 4%. Common sense demands that plan B is better funded than plan A by 4 
 
exactly $10,000. Under GASB’s methodology, however, Plan A appears better funded than plan 
B.  
To see this, suppose the workers are promised annual post retirement payments equal to 2% of 
their final salaries for each year of service. This implies annual payments recognized under the 
projected benefit obligation (PBO) of $10,500 per year (5 x 2% x $105,000 / year) starting in 
thirty years. If life annuities for 65 year old retirees make annual payments of 6% of the initial 
investment, then each employee’s currently recognized PBO liability can be satisfied with a 
payment in thirty years of $175,00 ($10,500 / 0.06).  
Plan A is, under GASB rules, fully funded. The present value of its thirty year liability of 
$175,000, discounted at the 10% expected return on its assets, is $10,000, the same as the value 
of its stock market holdings. Plan B, however, has an unfunded liability of $3,000 dollars under 
GASB. Its thirty year liability of $175,000 discounted at the plan's 7% expected return on assets 
(½ x 4% + ½ x 10%) is $23,000, $3,000 more than the value of its stocks and bonds. Despite the 
fact that plan B is identical to plan A in every respect except for the additional $10,000 it holds, 
GASB methodology holds that it is $3,000 less well funded.  
That is, GASB rules imply that a plan that must make a $175,000 payment in 30 years and owns 
$10,000 in stocks is better funded than a plan with the same liability and the same stock holdings 
but that additionally owns $10,000 in bonds. Plan B can thus improve its GASB funding status 
$3,000 by burning its bonds. 
Under proposed amendments to GASB’s rules on Accounting and Financial Reporting for 
Pensions (GASB 2011b), the plan that holds only stock would remain fully funded, while the 
plan that holds additional bonds would become even more underfunded. The proposals specify 
that projected benefit payments would be discounted using “(1) a long-term expected rate of 
return on plan investments to the extent that plan net position is projected to be sufficient to pay 
pensions and the net position projected to remain after each benefit payment can be invested 
long-term and (2) a tax-exempt, high-quality municipal bond index rate to the extent that the 
conditions in (1) are not met” (GASB 2011a). If adopted, this change would have no effect on 
the funding status of Plan A, because this plan’s “projected assets” are sufficient to pay its 
liabilities. It would cause a significant deterioration, however, in the funding status of plan B, the 5 
 
plan that holds an additional $10,000 in bonds. Plan B would be required to discount the 
projected 30 year funding shortfall of $23,000 ($175,000 – $20,000 x 1.07
30) at a lower rate, the 
rate on high-quality municipal bonds. If municipal bonds yield the same 4% as T-bills, this 
would force the fund to report an unfunded liability of $7,000. The proposed amendments to 
GASB, designed to “improve the decision-usefulness of information in employer financial 
reports,” would therefore make Plan B, which is self-evidently $10,000 better funded than Plan 
A, report that it was an additional $4,000 less well funded. 
GASB and the Yogi Berra Fallacy 
GASB’s methodology for calculating pension liabilities is not strictly a valuation methodology, 
as it does not assign a unique value to a given set of assets and liabilities. The methodology is 
susceptible to the “Yogi Berra Fallacy,” assigning different values to the exact same assets and 
liabilities when these are partitioned in different ways across plans. 
Yogi Berra famously once told a waitress “you better cut the pizza in four pieces, because 
I'm not hungry enough to eat six.” The absurdity of this statement is self apparent. A pizza is a 
pizza. How it is cut has no impact on the extent to which it satisfies a hungry diner. The same is 
true for a particular set of assets and liabilities, a fact not reflected in the GASB methodology. 
This can be illustrated, again, with our simple example. In the previous section we considered 
two plans that had a combined GASB underfunding of $3,000. This number depends not only on 
the assets and liabilities, however, but also on how these were assigned to the specific plans. If 
the state combined the two into a single plan, for example, its GASB underfunding would 
increase to $4,800 ($350,000/(1 + ⅔ x 10% + ⅓ x 4%)
30 – $30,000). GASB allows the state to 
recognize a smaller liability by keeping its workers on separate plans, despite the fact that this 
does not increase the value of its assets or reduce the payments it has to make. 
An Alternative Interpretation of GASB’s Methodology 
Finally, GASB’s methodology for accounting for liabilities has an equivalent alternative 
formulation. The explicitly prescribed procedure, which entails discounting a plan’s liabilities at 
the expected return on its assets, is completely equivalent to one in which a plan’s liabilities are 6 
 
discounted at rates that reflect the liabilities own risks, but the plan’s stock holdings are valued at 
more than twice their market values. 
GASB prescribes discounting projected benefit payments using the long-term expected rate of 
return “as long as plan assets related to current employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries are 
projected to be sufficient to make the projected benefit payments for those individuals,” and 
using a high-quality 30-year municipal bond index rate for “future benefit payments [that] are 
not expected to be made from long-term investments” (GASB 2011a).  The projection of plan 
assets includes assumptions about “…contributions from the government, current employees, 
and other contributing entities… based on actual contribution experience and the government’s 
current policies and practices.” 
While this methodology prescribes discounting the “funded” portion of the liabilities, i.e., those 
that will be paid out of current assets and investment earnings, using the assets’ required rate of 
return, it is actually irrelevant what discount rate is used. Because these liabilities are netted 
against assets, the net value of the assets and the netted portion of liabilities is zero regardless of 
the discount rate, provided the same discount rate is used to value the expected asset cash flows. 
Because the rate used to discount the assets and the netted portion of the liabilities is irrelevant, 
we can pick the rate GASB prescribes for discounting “unfunded” benefit payments, i.e., the 
high quality municipal bond rate.  
GASB therefore effectively prescribes that a plan for which current and expected future net 
assets will be insufficient to make its benefit payments should discount all its cash flows, those 
due to both its assets and its liabilities, at high quality muni bond rates.
1
                                                           
1 Though completely equivalent, this formulation is actually much simpler than that explicitly prescribed by GASB. 
 Discounting the 
projected benefit payments “in the same manner as unfunded long-term liabilities of the 
employer generally” yields an estimated pension liability that may be interpreted roughly as an 
“intrinsic” or “market” valuation. Discounting the asset cash flows at these same rates yields 
stock valuations that are more than twice as high as those determined by the market (see the 
appendix for details). GASB therefore effectively prescribes that these plans account for their 
liabilities at market values, but account for stocks at more than twice their market prices. 7 
 
GASB also allows plans to apply these high asset valuations to expected asset purchases when 
expected future assets are projected to be sufficient to make benefit payments, a condition 
generally interpreted to include those making their actuarially determined contributions, i.e., 
roughly half of all plans. In this case the methodology is equivalent to discounting both a plan’s 
liabilities and the expected cash flows to its assets at the appropriate discount rate for the plan’s 
liabilities, and further crediting the plan for its intention to buy more stock in the future.  
This can be seen by looking at a simple accounting identity. The GASB underfunding is given by 
discounting benefit payments in excess of those that can be paid using current assets and 
expected investment income at the expected return on the assets. This can be written as  
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t A  are the plan’s expected time-t cash flows from future  disposals to current assets to 
make benefit payments,  t B  are the time-t benefit payments, µ  is the expected return on the 
plan’s assets, and r is the rate used to discount high quality municipal bonds.  
The first term on the right hand side of the previous equation is the value of the plan’s asset cash 
flows when discounted at the rate used to discount high quality municipal bonds, and essentially 
entails booking stocks at two and a half times their traded prices. The second term is the value of 
the benefit payments discounted in the same manner as that used for long-term liabilities of the 
employer generally, and can be thought of as the fair market value of the obligations. The last 
two terms relate to benefit payments in excess of what can be paid out of current assets, which 
will be paid using assets the plan intends to buy in the future. The third term is the value of these 
future asset purchases when discounted at the rate used to discount high quality municipal bonds, 
while the fourth term is the value of these assets when discounted at the assets’ own required rate 
of return. Together they represent the difference between the value of cash flows to future asset 
purchases when stocks are booked at more than twice their market prices, and these assets’ actual 
market prices.  8 
 
This can be made concrete by again considering “plan B” from our earlier example, which has a 
$175,000 liability payment due in 30 years and holds $10,000 in stocks and $10,000 in bonds. 
Recall that because the expected return on the plan’s assets is 7% per year, GASB accounts for 
its liability at just under $23,000 ($175,000/1.07
30), implying a GASB underfunding of roughly 
$3,000.  
The alternative formulation of GASB’s methodology, which entails booking liabilities at 
intrinsic values, booking stocks at more than twice their traded price, and claiming a credit for 
stocks the plan intends to buy in the future, must yield the exact same underfunding, because it is 
equivalent to the explicit formulation. The intrinsic value of plan B’s liability results from 
discounting the benefit payment “…in the same manner as unfunded long-term liabilities of the 
employer generally” (GASB 2010). If the yield on high quality muni bonds is 4%, this gives an 
intrinsic liability value of $54,000 ($175,000/1.04
30).  
The plan gets to account for the $20,000 in assets it owns, however, at $47,000. This valuation is 
achieved by projecting the assets’ expected value on the benefit payment date to $152,000 
($20,000 x 1.07
30), and discounting this back at the rate used to discount high quality muni bonds 
($152,000/1.04
30 = $47,000). Moreover, the plan gets to take an additional credit of $4,000 for 
the stock it intends to buy in the future. To cover the projected shortfall the plan will need to own 
an additional $23,000 in assets ($175,000 – $152,000) on the date the benefit payment comes 
due. While the plan does not actually own these assets, it intends to buy them in the future. It 
consequently gets to book the difference between their accounting value and their market value. 
GASB accounts for them by discounting their projected value at the muni bond rate, i.e., at 
$7,000 ($23,000/1.04
30), despite the fact that they currently cost just $3,000 ($23,000/1.07
30). 
The plan consequently gets to credit itself the $4,000 difference today. Subtracting the $47,000 
accounting value of the plan’s $20,000 in assets, and the $4,000 accounting value of the plan’s 
intention to buy more assets in the future, from the $54,000 intrinsic value of the liabilities yields 
the $3,000 GASB underfunding. 
This formulation of GASB’s methodology may also be used to understand why GASB is subject 
to the Yogi Berra fallacy. Earlier we saw that the total underfunding of the two plans in our 
examples jumps from $3,000 to $4,800 if they are merged into a single plan, despite the fact that 
the combined plan holds the exact same assets and has the exact same liabilities. GASB views 9 
 
the merger as a commitment to sell stock in the future—the plans currently have two-thirds of 
their assets in stocks, a fraction that GASB assumes will increase as stocks outperform bonds if 
the state continues to run the plans as separate entities, but not if they are run as a single entity.  
Because GASB can be viewed as accounting for each dollar of stock at more than a dollar, this 
commitment to sell stocks at market prices hurts the plan’s current balance sheet. In our 
example, the direct cost of this commitment to sell stocks is more than $7,600. This is partly 
offset, however, by the fact that GASB now expects the plan to have to buy additional assets in 
the future, to make up the larger expected funding shortfall. Because GASB prescribes that these 
purchases are also valued at prices that exceed those observed in the market, this results in an 
offsetting $5,900 improvement in the plan’s finances. The difference, almost $1,800, is the net 
deterioration in the GASB recognized unfunded liability that results from combining the plans.     
Conclusion 
Accurate measurement of government pension liabilities is crucial for the efficient functioning of 
government. The funding status of government pension plans impacts planning and budgeting, 
routinely informing multi-billion dollar decisions. GASB has consequently committed itself “to 
develop high-quality standards of accounting and financial reporting for the state and local 
governments… [that] lead to information in financial reports that improves transparency, assists 
in assessing accountability, and is useful for making important decisions.” Its methodology for 
calculating government defined benefit pension liabilities has several features, however, that 
may obscure plans’ true funding status. In particular, it is possible that a plan can improve its 
GASB funding status by literally burning money. GASB also allows a pension system to 
improve its funding status by reapportioning its assets and liabilities across multiple funds, 
without altering the true economic nature of either its assets or liabilities. Finally, GASB’s 
methodology is economically equivalent to accounting for pension liabilities in the same manner 
that states accounts for their long-term liabilities more generally, but booking stocks at roughly 
twice their market price, and further crediting a plan an additional dollar for each dollar of stock 






The marginal value of moving a dollar from bonds to stock under GASB 
The change in the actuarial value of the liabilities with respect to a marginal change in the rate 
used to discount them is given by 
* dL D Ldy = − , where dy is the change in the discount rate and 
D* is the liabilities’ modified duration. The value of the assets do not change when a dollar is 
moved from bonds into stocks, so the change in the underfunding is  ( )
* d A L dL D Ldy −= −= . 
The expected return on a plan’s portfolio of stocks and bonds is  ( ) / y r xA λ = + , where r is the 
risk-free rate, x and A are the value of the plan’s stock position and total assets, respectively, and 
λ  is the market price of risk. The change in the expected return when the plan moves an 
additional dollar to stocks is the derivative of the expected return with respect to the stock market 
investment,  /
dy
dx A λ = .  
Taken together these imply that the change in the underfunding with respect to a change in the 
plan’s stock market position is given by 
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where D is the duration of the plan’s liabilities. Given a typical funding ratio of 80% (A/L = 
0.80), a typical liability duration of 15-20 years, an equity risk premium of 6-8%, and an 
assumed 8% return on plan assets, this implies that a plan’s funding status improves by $1.04-
$1.85 when it moves a dollar out of bonds and into the stock market. That is, GASB values a 
dollar in the stock market at roughly two and a half dollars.   11 
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